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A Dilemma of Doctrinal Design:  





In the conversations that take place among my female friends 
and colleagues, it is difficult to think of a more popular topic than how 
to balance work and family.  In the past year alone, the topic has given 
rise to several popular books and articles, including Anne-Marie 
Slaughter’s highly publicized piece in The Atlantic, “Why Women Still 
Can’t Have It All.”1  It is the perennial question—not just for my gen-
eration, but for several generations of women: How are women to 
balance work with starting and raising a family?  Is it possible to have 
the same career one would have had without having children?  Can 
one achieve the same status as men who are fathers but who are not 
burdened with the same caretaking expectations?  What does it mean 
to be a good mother?  Is that reconcilable with the professional goals 
we developed and nurtured before the ticking of our biological clocks 
was so audible in our minds?  The quest to balance work and family is 
clearly about evolving the workplace to allow women more flexibility, 
but it is also a debate about identity: how we perceive ourselves vis-à-
vis the workplace and the home; who we want to be as professionals 
and employees; and—for those of us who choose to be—who we want 
to be as parents.  Regardless of how accommodating or progressive 
workplaces become, the onus will also remain on us—and, for those of 
us who have partners, on them as well—to strike our own personal 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; 
B.A., Yale University.  I am thankful to Charlotte Alexander, Shalanda Baker, Jessica Clarke, 
Lynn Hogue and Eric Segall for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts.  I am grateful also 
for the insight gained from other participants in this Symposium.  I must thank Pamela Brannon 
and Lisa Scatamacchia for their invaluable research assistance.  Last, I am grateful to Michael 
Lucas for his willingness to work through nascent ideas—including those leading to this piece—
and for helping to negotiate our own work-family balance. 
 1 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, THE ATLANTIC (June 13, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-
all/309020/. 
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balance between work and family, and to define our own identity as 
working parents. 
My generation—now so mired in this dilemma—was born and 
raised in the wake of the women’s liberation movement, after land-
mark Supreme Court cases and other political milestones guaranteed 
women basic freedoms and allowed us to progress to a point where we 
can actively engage in this debate.  The rights that emerged from the 
doctrine were critical for women to gain entry into and establish 
themselves in the American workplace; they have also embedded 
themselves into our culture and our sense of identity as women.2  
Formal equality, the dominant approach applied by the Court in creat-
ing and defining these rights, sought to ensure that women were treat-
ed just as men were treated—much in the way that, as a legal matter, 
Americans were to be treated equally regardless of race—and that 
women had the same rights as men.3  As a result, formal equality 
played an important role in ensuring that women would not be treated 
as second-class citizens. 
But what do formal equality and the right to be treated as “same” 
mean in a world where only women can be pregnant and bear chil-
dren?  Or in a world where culturally and socially, women are ex-
pected to bear the majority of childrearing responsibilities?  The 
Court has been less clear and less consistent in this respect.4  Similarly, 
those women who have decided to have children have had a difficult 
time reconciling formal equality’s expectation of sameness with the 
quality of difference they may feel or yearn for in their dual identity 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Cf. RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 1 (1999) (“The lan-
guage of rights has been central to American political culture for centuries, and nearly every 
major issue in American political history has been argued as an issue of rights.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682, 690-91 (1973) (concluding that classi-
fications based on sex, like classifications based on race, are subject to heightened scrutiny and 
holding unconstitutional a statute that automatically deemed spouses of male military members, 
but not those of female members, dependents for purposes of obtaining benefits); Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 208-10 (1976) (invalidating, on Equal Protection grounds, statutes prohibiting sale 
of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 but allowing sale to females at the age of 18, reasoning 
that equal protection prohibits differential treatment based on gender just as it would differen-
tial treatment based on race, even if supported by quantifiable differences in drinking tenden-
cies); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (“We hold that gender, like race, is an 
unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.”). 
 4 Compare, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 650 (1974) (invalidating 
school board rule precluding teachers from returning to work until the next full semester after 
the teacher’s child has attained the age of three months, holding that “the age limitation serves 
no legitimate state interest, and unnecessarily penalizes the female teacher for asserting her right 
to bear children”), with Wimberly v Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 479 U.S. 511, 513, 516, 
522 (1987) (upholding application of state statute denying unemployment compensation to any 
claimant who leaves work “voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or his em-
ployer” to employees who leave work due to pregnancy).  See also infra Part II. 
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as working women and mothers or mothers-to-be.  If our goal is not to 
be the “same,” what does equality look like, and toward what end are 
we striving? 
The notion that formal equality does not provide a wholly satisfy-
ing answer to how women should be treated under the law is not a 
novel one:5 many feminist authors have advocated for alternative 
frameworks.6  In this piece, I do not focus on how the doctrine should 
manage the tension between sameness and difference.  As to the doc-
trine’s role regarding the work-family conflict, we may have exhausted 
its potential in setting a constitutional foundation to allow women to 
be treated as equals in the workplace and requiring that they not be 
discriminated against in the event that they decide to start a family.  
For purposes of this piece, those accomplishments constitute the first 
phase or “first generation” of progress.  Here, I am concerned with 
how the doctrine relates to what I refer to as the “second generation” 
of issues arising from the work-family conflict:7 how to balance work 
and family once some initial level of equality has been achieved; how 
to exercise the rights women now possess in practice; and the identity 
conflict faced by those struggling to be both the ideal parent and the 
model employee.  As I attempt to demonstrate herein, the Court’s 
rights-driven framework is better limited to first-generation questions 
of exclusion and overt discrimination.  I suggest that the rights-based 
paradigm8 is not particularly instructive—and may actually be coun-
terproductive—in thinking about how to actually structure one’s life 
or reconceptualize one’s identity after making the decision to have a 
child.  Four elements of the doctrinal rights-based framework in par-
ticular frustrate these aims: an overpowering emphasis on individual 
autonomy; its focus on enabling women to operate in a man’s world; 
the assumption of a uniform set of goals and priorities shared by all 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Arianne Renan Barzilay, Back to the Future:  Introducing Constructive Feminism for the 
Twenty-First Century—A New Paradigm for the Family and Medical Leave Act, 6 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 407, 431 (2012) (“[L]iberal feminism, in its incarnation in jurisprudence as formal 
equality, has not been able to remedy the work-family conflict.”). 
 6 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:  PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1993) (difference theory); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) (cultural feminism); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Domi-
nance, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:  DISCOURSES IN LIFE AND LAW 40-44 (1987) (dominance 
theory). 
 7 Cf. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural Ap-
proach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) (distinguishing between “first generation” patterns 
of bias, which involve overt acts of discrimination, and “second generation” claims of discrimina-
tion, which “involve social practices and patterns of interaction among groups within the work-
place that, over time, exclude nondominant groups”). 
 8 By “rights-based paradigm” or “rights-based framework,” I am referring to a paradigm 
focused on individual entitlements or freedoms grounded in constitutional law. 
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women; and its narrow, individualized accommodation of pregnancy.9  
Given their fundamental nature to first-generation legal victories, the-
se elements have been internalized not only legally but also culturally; 
as a result, they have spilled over into current policy debates.  In that 
context, I suggest that they are not only unhelpful but may actually 
have a negative influence in resolving second-generation problems. 
Doctrine tells us much about what we are or are not entitled to 
and how others are forbidden from treating us, but little about who we 
are or want to be as individuals; the former may be necessary but is 
not sufficient to determine the latter.  The answer to the latter ques-
tion is ultimately a very personal one that I do not and cannot attempt 
to answer globally.  Instead, I merely suggest that the paradigm under-
lying such foundational rights may be ill-suited to answer many of the 
questions that lie ahead.  Law still has an important role to play in 
evolving the workplace and changing cultural norms, but future poli-
cies would be well-served by following a set of guiding principles that 
are responsive to, and not derived from, the rights-based framework. 
II. GENDER DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE AND THE WORKING 
MOTHER 
The story of gender discrimination as it relates to the workplace 
starts with a very specific idea of who women are and the roles they 
are capable (or not capable) of serving.  In Bradwell v. Illinois,10 the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court’s denial of Myra 
Bradwell’s application for a license to practice law.11  Justice Bradley’s 
oft-cited concurrence in Bradwell adopted what has come to be 
known as the “separate spheres” approach, recognizing “a wide differ-
ence in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.”12  As 
to the woman—characterized by a “natural and proper timidity and 
delicacy”—it was clear to Justice Bradley and others that her “para-
mount mission and destiny [were] to fulfil the noble and benign offic-
es of wife and mother.”13 
With the advent of the women’s rights movement came a very 
different vision of the woman’s role in society and in the workplace.  
Heralded by attorneys like Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in her for-
mer role as ACLU attorney, the liberal feminist approach emphasized 
formal equality—i.e., that men and women should be treated the 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See infra Part III.A.1-4. 
 10 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
 11 Id. at 138-39. 
 12 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 13 Id. 
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same.14  Under the formal equality framework, the Court jettisoned 
the image of the woman as a stereotypical homemaker, instead em-
bracing a vision of the working woman as self-sufficient and whose 
goal was to be viewed as man’s equal in the workplace.15  Outmoded 
stereotypes and generalizations about women and their capabilities 
were no longer acceptable.16 
In Frontiero v. Richardson,17 the Court analogized the historical 
treatment of women to that of racial minorities,18 concluding that clas-
sifications based on sex must be treated with heightened scrutiny and 
that, as it had held in Reed v. Reed19 during the previous term, laws 
could not provide “dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . 
. . similarly situated.”20  In Craig v. Boren,21 in which the Court adopted 
the standard of intermediate scrutiny for sex-based classifications,22 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on Equality and Gender Discrimination in Em-
ployment, 1971-2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 501, 520 (2004).  This may relate to the fact that 
the demarcation of gender as a suspect classification was made, at least in part, by analogies to 
race, an area in which formal equality has also had much traction but in which the application of 
“sameness” is perhaps less problematic. 
 15 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 n.11 (1975) (“[T]he presumption of 
complete dependency of wives upon husbands has little relationship to present reality.”); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (rejecting the “romantic paternalism” of prior 
Supreme Court cases addressing gender roles and explaining that such paternalism “put women 
not on a pedestal, but in a cage”); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) 
(holding company’s refusal of employment to mothers but not to fathers of pre-school-age chil-
dren was prima facie sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII). 
 16 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (“[G]eneralizations about ‘the way 
women are,’ estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying oppor-
tunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description.”); Stan-
ton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) (“No longer is the female destined solely for the home 
and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.”); 
Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 645 (explaining in striking down statute providing differential survivors’ 
benefits depending on the deceased’s sex that the gender-based stereotype that men are the 
primary supporters of a family “cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of women 
who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support”); Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (invalidating statute excluding a woman from acting as adminis-
trator of an estate if a male qualifies for the position). 
 17 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 18 Id. at 685-86 (comparing sex to race in terms of immutability, visibility and past histori-
cal discrimination).  “[I]ndeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in 
our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave 
codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own 
names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey prop-
erty or to serve as legal guardians of their own children. . . . With these considerations in mind, 
we can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race . . . 
are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 685, 688. 
 19 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (holding statutory classifications that distinguish between males 
and females are “subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause”). 
 20 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 683-84 (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 77).  
 21 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  
 22 Id. at 197. 
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Justice Brennan wrote that the Court would not tolerate laws ground-
ed in “archaic and overbroad generalizations,” “old notions of role 
typing,” or “outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in 
the home rather than in the marketplace and world of ideas.”23  In cas-
es like Weinberger v. Weisenfeld (decided the year before Craig),24 
Califano v. Goldfarb,25 Califano v. Westcott,26 and Wengler v. Druggists 
Mutual Insurance Co.,27 the Court continued in much the same vein, 
invalidating laws stemming from women’s traditional dependency on 
men.28  In doing so, the Court acknowledged women’s equal role as 
wage earners and validated their equal status to men in the work-
place.29 
In the landmark case United States v. Virginia (VMI),30 the Court 
held that women could not constitutionally be excluded from a tradi-
tionally all-male military college;31 the underlying narrative was that 
women should not be presumed incapable of performing even the 
most male of military roles.32  The Court gave short shrift to the notion 
that “real differences” justified women’s exclusion from VMI, holding 
that “generalizations about ‘the way women are’ . . . [could not] justify 
denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Id. at 198-99 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (holding gender-based differentiation in a statutory scheme for 
awarding social security benefits unconstitutional, finding it premised on assumptions about 
wives’ dependency). 
 25 430 U.S. 199, 205-07 (1977) (holding gender-based distinction between widows and wid-
owers in a Social Security Act provision—allowing a widower to receive survivor’s benefits only 
if he was receiving at least half of his support from his wife, but allowing a widow to receive 
benefits based on earnings of her deceased husband regardless of her dependency—violated due 
process and equal protection). 
 26 443 U.S. 76, 79, 89 (1979) (invalidating statute providing benefits to families whose de-
pendent children were deprived of parental support because of father’s unemployment, but not 
providing such benefits as a result of mother’s unemployment). 
 27 446 U.S. 142, 152-53 (1980) (holding provision of Missouri law denying a widower bene-
fits on his wife’s work-related death unless he was either mentally or physically incapacitated or 
could prove dependence on his wife’s earnings but granting a widow benefits without proof of 
dependency violated equal protection). 
 28 Another line of cases from the same era allowed for sex-based distinctions to compen-
sate women for past or present inequalities.  See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977) 
(upholding Social Security Act provision allowing women to eliminate additional low-earning 
years from the calculation of their retirement benefit, finding the provision “work[ed] directly to 
remedy some part of the effect of past discrimination”); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 
(1975) (holding statutory scheme allowing women naval officers a longer tenure of commis-
sioned service than male officers before mandatory discharge for want of promotion does not 
violate Due Process Clause); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974) (upholding Florida 
statute that grants widows, but not widowers, annual $500 property tax exemption). 
 29 See SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, ELUSIVE EQUALITY:  WOMEN’S RIGHTS, PUBLIC POLICY 
AND THE LAW 16-17 (2011). 
 30 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 31 Id. at 545-46, 555-56, 558. 
 32 Id. at 549-50. 
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outside the average description.”33  As in Frontiero,34 the Court relied 
on race-based analogies, comparing Virginia’s treatment of women to 
Texas’s treatment of African-Americans years earlier.35  Ultimately, 
the image of the doctrinal woman transformed into one whose goals 
and capabilities were no different from her male counterparts; she was 
undoubtedly entitled to the same treatment and any differences in 
treatment would be viewed with a very skeptical eye. 
The doctrine has been less consistent and perhaps less clear when 
it comes to pregnancy and the workplace, in part because women and 
men can never be true equals in this context.36  The question of how 
formal equality applies to men and women when only women bear 
children is a difficult one.  Does pregnancy justify differential treat-
ment, and if so, what kind of differential treatment is permissible?  At 
its best, the doctrine ensures that women cannot be discriminated 
against or excluded from opportunity as a result of pregnancy.  At its 
worst, it has treated pregnancy as a non-issue or as a justification for 
unfair treatment. 
To elaborate, the rights-based framework is well designed to 
guard against exclusion or overt discrimination—e.g., protecting the 
individual from being shut out of the workplace as a result of preg-
nancy.  In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,37 for example, the 
Court invalidated a mandatory leave policy requiring pregnant teach-
ers to take maternity leave at a certain point during their pregnancy, 
regardless of their individual condition.  In doing so—relying on a 
substantive due process rather than equal protection rationale—the 
Court explained that female teachers could not be “unduly penalize[d] 
. . . for deciding to bear a child” and pushed back against the school 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Id. at 550.  
 34 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973). 
 35 VMI, 518 U.S. at 553–54. 
 36 A discussion of the doctrine surrounding work and family—particularly when it involves 
a discussion of pregnancy—would not be complete without mention of a woman’s right not to be 
pregnant, i.e., to terminate a pregnancy.  Women cannot participate in society as equals without 
the ability to choose whether and when to have a child.  Cf. Kristina M. Mentone, Note, When 
Equal Protection Fails:  How the Equal Protection Justification for Abortion Undercuts the Strug-
gle for Equality in the Workplace, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2657, 2659 (2002) (arguing that this line 
of reasoning “may help to equalize women who choose not to be mothers, but it perpetuates the 
view that mothers cannot be truly equal because motherhood interferes with their professional 
success” and that “the equal protection argument for abortion aggravates the work/family con-
flict for mothers”).  While I do not cover the entirety of abortion law here, in part because it 
raises a host of other issues, I do acknowledge that a woman’s right to choose not to be pregnant 
or have a child and the ways in which that right has been restricted in recent years have had and 
will have an important impact on women’s ability to achieve equality in the workplace and oth-
erwise, particularly for those of limited financial means and without adequate healthcare or 
access to child care. 
 37 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
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board’s “presumption of physical incompetency” and desire to “insu-
late the classroom from the presence of potentially incapacitated 
pregnant teachers.”38  Similarly, in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,39 de-
cided nearly two decades later, the Court “explicitly rejected the no-
tion that a woman’s reproductive function was a legitimate workplace 
concern,”40 holding that pregnant women could not be excluded from 
jobs involving actual or potential exposure to lead for fear of potential 
damage to the developing fetus.41  In doing so, the Court rejected the 
“separate spheres” framework, presenting a “modern day counter-
point to Bradwell.”42  In both cases, the Court emphasized the im-
portance of the woman’s individual autonomy and the impermissibil-
ity of making generalized assumptions about a woman or her preg-
nancy: “It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual 
employers to decide whether a woman’s reproductive role is more 
important to herself and her family than her economic role.”43 
In contrast, the rights-based framework has been less helpful 
when it comes to negotiating workplace dynamics after the initial 
hurdle of inclusion has been overcome, or the application of existing 
structures to women who are no longer similarly situated.  The Court 
in Geduldig v. Aiello44 emphasized that pregnancy constituted a “real” 
physical difference between women and men justifying differential 
treatment and that the denial of disability benefits for pregnancy did 
not constitute impermissible sex-based discrimination: the division 
being drawn by employers was not between men and women, but 
placed men and non-pregnant women on one side and pregnant wom-
en on the other.45  Two years later, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,46 
the Court suggested that pregnancy need not be treated like any other 
“disease or disability” under a company’s benefits plan because it is a 
“voluntarily taken and desired condition.”47  In combination with 
LaFleur, these cases suggest that while women could not be forced out 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. at 644, 648.  See also id. at 653 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The records before us 
abound with proof that a principal purpose behind the adoption of the regulations was to keep 
visibly pregnant teachers out of the sight of schoolchildren.”). 
 39 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 40 Lens, supra note 14, at 555. 
 41 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 192, 200, 206, 211. 
 42 Lens, supra note 14, at 555. 
 43 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211. 
 44 417 U.S. 484 (1974).  Geduldig has never been overruled by the Court, but was later 
effectively overruled by congressional enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). 
 45 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20. 
 46 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 47 Id. at 136.  Gilbert’s interpretation of Title VII was eventually rejected by Congress, 
following its passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). 
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of employment as a result of their pregnancy, there was no require-
ment that the workplace accommodate their pregnancy and certainly 
not that it adapt in response.  In Wimberly v. Missouri,48 the Court 
again divorced pregnancy from gender, upholding Missouri’s decision 
to refuse unemployment compensation to women who had voluntarily 
left their position of employment (in this case, the plaintiff was not 
rehired because no position was available).49  To resolve the case oth-
erwise, in the Wimberly Court’s view, would be to require “preferen-
tial treatment for women on account of pregnancy.”50  Under this ap-
proach, the Court rendered pregnancy a non-issue in the workplace, 
despite its prejudicial effect on women choosing to conceive and bear 
a child—an example of more formalist “equal treatment” resulting in 
unequal treatment in practice.51 
Supreme Court doctrine has not had much to contribute to con-
versations about work-family balance beyond the point of pregnancy.52  
Perhaps this involves some recognition of its own limitations: ques-
tions of childrearing do not involve the same biological component as 
                                                                                                                           
 48 479 U.S. 511 (1987). 
 49 Id. at 513, 522. 
 50 Id. at 521. 
 51 In contrast, a decade earlier in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), the Court 
held that employers could not deny women the opportunity to accumulate job seniority while on 
maternity leave.  Rather than viewing the refusal as providing a benefit to women because they 
were pregnant, the Court viewed the refusal as “impos[ing] on women a substantial burden that 
men need not suffer.”  Id. at 142.  Under this difference theory type of approach, the Court at-
tempted to address the fact that pregnancy did constitute a tangible difference between the 
experience of men and women in the workplace and attempted to compensate women for the 
potential challenges they may face as a result. 
 52 The Court has touched only indirectly on the ramifications pregnancy may have for 
ongoing parental differences between men and women.  For example, in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 
53 (2001), the Court seemed to suggest that the ability to bear a child necessarily results in a 
closer relationship between parent and child.  In its words, because the mother is always present 
at the birth of a child, there is a greater “opportunity for mother and child to develop a real, 
meaningful relationship.”  Id. at 65.  The Court went on to observe that “[t]he same opportunity 
does not result from the event of birth, as a matter of biological inevitability, in the case of the 
unwed father.”  Id.  In her dissent, Justice O’Connor pushed back against what she viewed as the 
application of stereotype: “Indeed, the idea that a mother’s presence at birth supplies adequate 
assurance of an opportunity to develop a relationship while a father's presence at birth does not 
would appear to rest only on an overbroad sex-based generalization.  A mother may not have an 
opportunity for a relationship if the child is removed from his or her mother on account of al-
leged abuse or neglect, or if the child and mother are separated by tragedy, such as disaster or 
war, of the sort apparently present in this case.  There is no reason, other than stereotype, to say 
that fathers who are present at birth lack an opportunity for a relationship on similar terms.”  Id. 
at 86–87 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (finding a genuine issue of 
material fact to exist with regard to whether the family obligations of women with preschool age 
children were “demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a woman than a man” and 
could constitute a “bona fide occupational qualification” under federal statutory law). 
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pregnancy and are perhaps even more enmeshed with social and cul-
tural issues that the Court is ill-equipped or poorly suited to address.  
Given the Court’s institutional limitations, much of the law re-
garding gender and the workplace has been written by legislatures.  
Statutory law has obviously been an important source of rights re-
garding women’s equality in the workplace, and much of Supreme 
Court doctrine is based on the Court’s review or interpretation of the-
se statutes.  Some of the rights grounded in statutory law mirror the 
Court’s emphasis on formal equality: for example, the Family Medical 
Leave Act’s guarantee of twelve weeks of unpaid leave to both men 
and women,53 and the Equal Pay Act’s requirement that both sexes be 
paid the same amount of wages for the same work.54  Other statutory 
provisions specifically address the unique needs of women with chil-
dren: for example, the Fair Labor Standards Act’s requirement that 
employers provide time and appropriate conditions for breastfeeding 
mothers to express milk during the workday;55 and the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act’s provision that discrimination “on the basis of preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” constitutes unlawful 
sex discrimination under Title VII.56  I cannot attempt to cover the vast 
array of Supreme Court cases interpreting statutory law regarding 
gender and the workplace in this short piece.  For purposes of this ar-
ticle, which focuses on the gender-based discrimination framework 
and correlating rights grounded in constitutional law, what is most 
interesting about some of these cases is the Court’s implicit acknowl-
edgement that legislation and public policy may be better suited to 
address second-generation issues of work and family balance, given 
their ability to bridge the gap between fundamental doctrinal rights 
and the individual project of constructively structuring one’s own life.  
In California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra,57 for example, 
the Court interpreted a state statute requiring employers to provide 
maternity leave and reinstatement to pregnant women not as “prefer-
ential treatment” but as a means to allow “women as well as men, to 
have families without losing their jobs.”58  In holding that the statute 
was not preempted by federal law, the Court noted Title VII’s purpose 
to “guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 § 102 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 
2612(a)(1)(A)-(E) (2011). 
 54 Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006). 
 55 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(A)-(B) (2011). 
 56 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). 
 57 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
 58 Id. at 289. 
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the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full 
participation in family life.”59 
So where does the doctrine leave us?  In an effort to ensure that 
women are not unfairly excluded from the workplace or treated as a 
subordinated class of citizens or employees, the Court has, for the 
most part, adopted a framework of formal equality, emphasizing 
sameness of treatment for men and women, and disallowing the use of 
stereotypes about a woman’s role or place in society.  The overwhelm-
ing message is that women must have the freedom to pursue any op-
portunity open to men and they must not be shut out of the workplace 
based on temporary periods of difference (i.e., pregnancy).  While this 
may be empowering from the vantage point of someone who other-
wise would not have such access at all, it is also a view that, as I discuss 
below, may create tension—both as a practical matter and internally, 
as a matter of identity—once the same woman has gained entry and is 
attempting to figure out how the rights she exercised to get there 
mesh with her current reality. 
III. THE NEXT PHASE: RESPONDING TO THE RIGHTS-BASED 
FRAMEWORK 
The constitutional victories within gender discrimination doctrine 
provide an invaluable foundation for the discussion we can now have 
about what role we perceive in today’s workplace for women who are 
also mothers and for men who are also fathers.  However, while the 
rights-based framework has provided a critical basis for women’s pro-
gress, it is only the first step in a longer journey.  It is limited as a 
framework for the next phase: determining how, as individuals, we will 
all personally negotiate the terrain that has been carved out by the 
rights and entitlements guaranteed to us and to others by the doctrine.  
No one can fulfill multiple roles at full capacity simultaneously, and 
yet for many women who grew up with these cases as our guideposts, 
even unconsciously or culturally, the rights-based framework may lead 
us to believe we are entitled or should strive to do just that. 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Id. (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 29658 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams)).  In some cases, 
the Court has gone further, acknowledging that even statutory law may have difficulties over-
coming deeply entrenched social and cultural norms.  See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (“Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel 
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. . . . These mutually reinforcing 
stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to 
assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views about 
women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.”).  While the FMLA provides for 
leave for both men and women, in practice, many workplaces do not treat maternity and paterni-
ty leave the same, and certainly the cultural expectations surrounding maternity and paternity 
leave are very different. 
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A. Where Rights Go Wrong 
Under the doctrinal paradigm, the focus is on rights and entitle-
ments: that which a woman has a right to pursue (i.e., equal treatment, 
full participation in the workplace); the right to accommodation of her 
pregnancy (i.e., ability to accrue seniority and other benefits while on 
leave or the right to reinstatement post-leave); and the right to be free 
from discrimination in the workplace as a result of her sex or her 
pregnancy.  Four dominant aspects of this paradigm, described below, 
operate in parallel to the work-family debate; their influence may be 
problematic in addressing second-generation questions of identity and 
balancing work and family in practice. 
1. Individual Autonomy 
Perhaps the strongest unitary theme throughout the doctrine is 
that of a woman’s individual autonomy, whether in the form of seek-
ing to shed her status as economically dependent on her husband, de-
siring to define the terms of her maternity leave and when and how 
she will stop and resume working, or aiming to control what jobs or 
working conditions are appropriate for her (whether pregnant or 
not).60  Contrary to the “separate spheres” mentality, under which 
women had a pre-ordained destiny (largely within the confines of the 
home), it is now more widely acknowledged—at least by the doc-
trine—that women have the right to determine their own destiny.61  
The Johnson Controls Court may have been correct when it observed: 
“It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual em-
ployers to decide whether a woman’s reproductive role is more im-
portant to herself and her family than her economic role.  Congress 
has left this choice to the woman as hers to make.”62  Yet a woman’s 
ability to exercise individual autonomy can only be part of the equa-
tion.  Focusing on women’s autonomy alone puts an undue amount of 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (rejecting one-way presumption of 
dependence of a wife on her husband in determining unemployment benefits); Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1977) (rejecting gender-based Social Security classification scheme 
making “assumptions as to [women's] dependency”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632, 640, 648 (1974) (providing greater autonomy to a woman in defining terms of maternity 
leave); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (emphasizing the individual 
woman’s ability to make choices about her working conditions and their potential impact on her 
fertility). 
 61 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (“The destiny of the 
woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and 
her place in society.”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (rejecting legal traditions 
of “romantic paternalism,” referencing Bradwell, which placed “women, not on a pedestal, but in 
a cage” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 62 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211. 
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pressure and responsibility on women, and our cultural focus on indi-
vidualism can be isolating or debilitating as well as empowering.63  The 
doctrine’s structure implies that while it is a woman’s choice to make, 
or her balance to strike, the costs of that decision are her cross to bear, 
to say nothing of the judgment that may follow. 
Focusing on the woman’s autonomy to make decisions about her 
own career or body without attention to context or the costs that ac-
company the exercise of one-sided autonomy render it a Catch-22. For 
example, a woman’s choice to focus primarily on her career cannot be 
fully realized without the parallel ability for her partner to take on a 
greater role as caregiver or affordable child care options.  A woman’s 
autonomy to make her own choices would be much more meaningful 
if it were not presumed that she must be the one taking on such re-
sponsibilities (or that she could take on all of them if only she could 
find a way to strike an impossible balance).64  Other actors must also 
be enabled or incentivized to relieve some of the burden on women, 
so that women also have the autonomy to disclaim responsibility—for 
example, by allowing men and other family members more flexibility 
to serve as caregivers.65   
It is the value of individual autonomy that is perhaps most re-
sponsible for the persistence of the “having it all” debate.  There is an 
underlying premise to the debate that we are entitled to “have it all” 
(isn’t that what our predecessors were working for?) and, but for the 
inflexibility of workplace dynamics or unwilling spouses, it would be 
possible; if we just try hard enough, we will figure out the solution—
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Women’s Rights, Affirmative Action, and the Myth of Indi-
vidualism, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 338, 343 (1986) (“Many women cling to the promise of indi-
vidualism with all the fervor of those long excluded . . . . We have long assumed that all we re-
quired was admission to those inner sancta, those corridors of power, for us to flourish as our 
brothers have flourished.  It has not worked that way.  Or rather it has only worked that way for 
a few.  And for those for whom it has worked have had a disconcerting tendency to look very 
much like honorary men . . . .”).  Similarly, autonomy’s emphasis on the vast array of options 
available to women in theory—when, in reality, any person can select only some (whether due to 
financial infeasibility or simply a lack of capacity)—may be just as stressful as it is liberating.  Cf. 
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004) 
(arguing that the dominance of the “autonomy myth” in public thought obscures the inevitability 
and normality of societal dependency). 
 64 See Michael Selmi, The Work-Family Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men and Respon-
sibility, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 573, 598 (2007) (noting that certain policy changes “will be insuffi-
cient, especially if men do not take the leave when it is available, or if women continue to have 
responsibility for home life” and that “we need to focus on getting men to change their behavior, 
and to a lesser extent, women to change their behavior”). 
 65 Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1073 (1996) (“[M]en are socially and legally excluded from caring and 
nurturing roles.”). 
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and the burden is on us to do so.66  There is a distinction, however, be-
tween autonomy—the ability to make an unrestrained life choice—
and the necessity of exercising personal judgment to determine which 
life choices one will actually make, particularly when some choices are 
not compatible or feasible.  For example, exercising one’s autonomy to 
be treated as man’s absolute equal in the workplace may not neces-
sarily be compatible with exercising one’s autonomy to have one’s 
pregnancy or role in childrearing fully accommodated by the work-
place.  The contradictory nature of the rights doctrine provides us with 
different choices, but it cannot resolve for us which one to make.  
Moreover, while autonomy is a critical element to ensuring freedom 
of profession and life choices, it does little to address the inner conflict 
or tension that may result from trying to actually strike a work-life or 
work-family balance.  For example, when a young female employee in 
a male-dominated and male norm-driven workplace is debating 
whether to take her entire maternity leave and wondering how it will 
be perceived by her colleagues, male and female, it may be of little 
comfort to know that she has the “right” to do so.  And without the 
financial, social and cultural support to make any choice she so de-
sires,67 autonomy may be a meaningless promise. 
2. Claiming a Place for Women in a Man’s World 
To the extent it is concerned with sex-based discrimination, the 
doctrine often assumes that change will happen primarily in one direc-
tion: women should be allowed into what has traditionally been a 
male sphere.  Therefore, it is our ideas about women that must change, 
and women who must be afforded rights that allow them to be treated 
just like men.68  In much the same way, the “having it all” debate still 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Anne-Marie Slaughter frames the supportive spouse myth as follows: “[H]aving a sup-
portive mate may well be a necessary condition if women are to have it all, but it is not suffi-
cient.” Slaughter, supra note 1. 
 67 See infra Part III.A.5. 
 68 While much of sex-based discrimination doctrine is based on cases involving male plain-
tiffs—see generally Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that a state 
nursing school could not limit its enrollment to women)—in many of those same cases, including 
Hogan, the exclusion or differential treatment of men was held in disfavor due at least in part to 
its basis in impermissible stereotypes about women (i.e., nursing is an exclusively female profes-
sion).  Id. at 729-30 & n.16 (“Indeed, the only statement of legislative purpose is that in § 37-117-
3 of the Mississippi Code . . . a statement that relies upon the very sort of archaic and overbroad 
generalizations about women that we have found insufficient to justify a gender-based classifica-
tion.”); see also, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-53 (1980) (striking 
down law denying widower benefits on his wife’s work-related death unless he was either men-
tally or physically incapacitated or could prove dependence on his wife’s earnings but granting a 
widow death benefits without proof of dependence, stating that the “bare assertion [that men are 
more likely to be the principal supporters of their spouses and families] . . . falls far short of 
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presents as a “women’s” dilemma.  Most of the articles and books de-
scribing work-family balance are targeted at women; it is much rarer 
to hear a commentator ask whether men can “have it all” or discuss 
the struggle men also face in balancing work and family and resisting 
pressure to conform to certain identity expectations.  Many commen-
tators writing on the topic acknowledge that no one can in fact have it 
all, and yet an inordinate amount of time and energy has been spent 
on behalf of women trying to discern the formula that will yield that 
result.69  
Given the historical and political context, it makes sense that 
rights doctrine focuses almost exclusively on the woman’s right to 
equal treatment. It was women who were discriminated against and 
being refused treatment as equals, both legally and socially; it is logical 
to focus on gaining entrance for women into a man’s world when the 
primary problem is exclusion.  However, the questions now posed re-
late to how women will function in that world and what that world will 
look like (and what it will expect or allow of both men and women).  
While some focus on women is clearly still needed, focusing discussion 
of the work-family conflict exclusively on women puts an undue bur-
den on women to solve the balancing dilemma on their own and ren-
ders men passive actors, ignoring their necessary role in the equation 
and the fact that they too may be dealing with similar identity issues. 
Moreover, assuming a male norm70 or assuming that women must 
incorporate themselves into a pre-existing (previously all-male) 
                                                                                                                           
justifying gender-based discrimination on the grounds of administrative convenience”); Califano 
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977) (striking down statutes requiring a widower to prove 
dependence on his wife in order to claim benefits relating to her employment because of their 
basis in a presumption of wives’ dependency). 
 69 See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 1; see also Our Struggle to Have it All—10 Views, 
CNN.COM (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/12/opinion/roundup-having-it-all (profil-
ing a group of ten prominent women describing “when they realized they could—or could not—
have it all”); Debora Spar, Why Women Should Stop Trying to Be Perfect, THE DAILY BEAST 
(Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/09/23/why-women-should-stop-
trying-to-be-perfect.html (describing the dilemma of juggling work and family as a “women’s 
problem” and suggesting strategies that women might employ to solve it); cf. CHERYL 
SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (Knopf 2013) (noting the dearth 
of women in leadership positions, urging women to be more assertive in their professional ambi-
tions, and emphasizing the inevitability of trade-offs, particularly for women who are also at-
tempting to start or raise a family). 
 70 Formal equality is often faulted for basing equality on a male norm, or attempting to 
find a place for women in a world structured by male terms.  See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 34 (1987) (critiquing an approach that 
measures women “according to our correspondence with man, [and judges] our equality . . . by 
our proximity to his measure”); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST 
THEORY OF THE STATE 225 (1991) (“The women that gender neutrality benefits . . . are mostly 
women who have achieved a biography that somewhat approximates the male norm, at least on 
paper.”). 
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framework without any expectation that the framework itself will 
evolve,71 sets misguided expectations and results in a mindset of “ac-
commodation,” in which women must carve out workable space in a 
workplace defined on male terms.72  A major flaw of the “having it all” 
debate is that it presumes that the traditionally “male” approach73—
working full-time and prioritizing career over family obligations (at 
least in terms of time allotment)74—is the ideal, and any alternative 
that women create in order to accommodate family or other obliga-
tions should be measured against that norm.75  What may be creating 
so much cognitive dissonance today, for working women (and men) 
with children, is the fact that many of them have internalized that 
norm—even if unconsciously or unwillingly—and it may not mesh 
with their newly developing identity as a parent or as someone who 
wishes to play a prominent role in their children’s upbringing.  
The assumption that work-family balance is a “woman’s prob-
lem” prevents us from engaging in a universal conversation about how 
any individual can balance career and family or personal life.  As 
Deborah Rhode has observed: “At issue is not simply equality be-
tween the sexes, but the quality of life for both of them.”76    
3. Making Group-Based Assumptions 
The group-based rights paradigm assumes that, as a class, women 
possess a shared set of priorities or goals about the role they wish to 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Compare the radical critique of VMI, which posits that the decision simply allowed 
women to be admitted into an inhospitable environment founded on a sexist philosophy rather 
than requiring the institution to take affirmative steps toward restructuring itself.  DANIEL A. 
FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 407 (4th ed. 2009). 
 72 Note that “accommodation” could also be conceptualized as the need for the workplace 
to adapt so that it more effectively satisfies the needs of its various constituents.  See infra Part 
III.A.4. 
 73 I am not assuming this is the ideal for some or all men, but rather the norm that devel-
oped in a male-oriented workplace.  See generally Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 
OR. L. REV. 359 (2004) (explaining that both women and gender non-conforming men may not 
comport with notions of masculinity in the workplace).  The undertone of many of the articles 
written in this vein suggests this is the path women would pursue but for their decision to have 
children and that maximizing one’s productiveness at work is the goal both pre- and post-
children.  
 74 Id. at 380-84 (describing five identified masculinities present in the workplace: authori-
tarianism, paternalism, entrepreneurialism, informalism, and careerism). 
 75 See Gender Norms: Spending more time with our families, ECONOMIST.COM (Jun. 22, 
2012), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/06/gender-norms (acknowl-
edging the male-centric paradigm and societal skepticism about “reorder[ing] our society to 
guarantee that one group of people shouldn’t have to choose between competing priorities, just 
because nature has decreed that they weigh those priorities differently”). 
 76 DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 320 
(1989). 
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play in the workplace and about how they wish to be treated as preg-
nant women or as mothers.  In doing so, it creates and builds upon a 
value system that may not mesh with a given individual’s values.  Re-
garding anti-essentialist critiques, Jessica Clarke has written: “Any 
claim to rights based on ‘women’s experiences’ is essentialist because 
it assumes the category of women has a unitary and coherent essence, 
whether based in biology or culture.”77  To the extent that the doctrine 
surrounding gender in the workplace has, for the most part, been dom-
inated by a formal equality approach, it has presumed “sameness” and 
therefore a male norm as the baseline—assuming that the goal for all 
women is to be treated just as men are or have been treated.78  
The irony of rights formation is that it is difficult to designate a 
right without making implicit judgments about the group claiming the 
right.  Moreover, rights definition may also solidify that group’s status 
and enable further group-based subordination:  
To have a right as a woman is not to be free of being designated 
and subordinated by gender.  Rather, though it may entail some 
protection from the most immobilizing features of that designa-
tion, it reinscribes the designation as it protects us, and thus ena-
bles our further regulation through that designation.79   
And although women may be protected as a group, their individ-
uality and their own notions of identity may simultaneously be placed 
in jeopardy.  In the words of Martha Minow: “People who share a trait, 
like race or gender, may differ in many other ways. . . . The gap be-
tween the representative who shares the group trait and the interests 
and needs of people in the group may lead to painful disputes over 
authenticity and over the relationship between identity and experi-
ence.”80  Similarly, social theorist Judith Butler has observed: 
The minute that the category of women is invoked as describing 
the constituency for which feminism speaks, an internal debate 
invariably begins over what the descriptive content of that term 
will be. . . . In the early 1980s, the feminist ‘we’ rightly came under 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 
86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1242 (2011). 
 78 See MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 70, at 221 (“Gender neu-
trality is the male standard.  The special protection rule is the female standard.  Masculinity or 
maleness is the referent for both.”). 
 79 Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 
420, 422 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); see also Clarke, supra note 77, at 1242 (“Oth-
er feminists have argued that in creating rights against discrimination, the law produces the very 
stigmatized identities it is intended to protect.”). 
 80 MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 35 
(1997). 
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attack by women of color who claimed that ‘we’ was invariably 
white, and that the ‘we’ that was meant to solidify the movement 
was the very source of painful factionalization.  The effort to 
characterize a feminine specificity through recourse to maternity, 
whether biological or social, produced a similar factionalization 
and even a disavowal of feminism altogether.  For surely all 
women are not mothers; some cannot be, some are too young or 
too old to be, some choose not to be, and for some who are 
mothers, that is not necessarily the rallying point of their politici-
zation in feminism.81 
A rights-focused approach not only runs the risk of essentialism, it 
also presents the danger of promoting a universal vision for women’s 
destiny: “[R]ights for women based on their role as mothers do not 
simply reflect the reality that many women are mothers; they promote 
that vision of reality.”82  Regardless of the way in which rights are 
structured and their undoubted value, their formation may have the 
unintended effect of making assumptions about or imposing expecta-
tions on the affected class. 
4. Making Room for Motherhood 
While the Court has been fairly consistent in emphasizing indi-
vidual autonomy, it has been less clear about how pregnancy should 
be treated in the workplace.  While the right to equal treatment in the 
workplace can serve to empower women in forging new professional 
paths, rights in the context of pregnancy are typically framed as the 
right to be free from discrimination—pregnant women cannot be 
forced out of the workplace and they must be allowed back in—or the 
right to accommodation.  While many such accommodations are nec-
essary, there is an important distinction between viewing accommoda-
tions as narrow measures that begrudgingly allow an individual to 
continue on in an otherwise unchanged environment and thinking 
about accommodation as the adoption of more universal measures or 
environmental adaptations that are seen as benefiting society as a 
whole.83  Regardless of the necessity for accommodation, a paradigm 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of “Postmodernism,” 
in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 15 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).  This 
seems like an apt point at which to clarify that in writing on this topic, I am by no means assum-
ing or suggesting that all women have children or attempt to balance work and childrearing.  I 
am merely focusing on the audience to which some of these observations may be applicable. 
 82 Clarke, supra note 77, at 1243. 
 83 As to the latter view, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 839 (2008) (describing the benefits of accommodation to third parties) and Dina Bakst, 
Pregnant, and Pushed Out of a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012, at A25, available at 
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that assumes an existing framework into which pregnant women must 
be shoehorned—perhaps at the risk of great hostility—is likely to 
have negative emotional, social, and cultural ramifications. 
Under the rights-based framework—which, in the context of 
pregnancy, focuses largely on anti-discrimination—pregnancy has 
been, at best, viewed as a “burden” requiring compensatory treatment 
and at its worst, as a legitimate basis for discrimination or an imposi-
tion preventing women from achieving their full potential.84  Pregnan-
cy is very rarely, if ever, viewed as a positive aspect of a woman’s iden-
tity or something that should be celebrated, largely because in the 
doctrine it typically arises in the context of a woman claiming preg-
nancy-related discrimination.  It is not viewed as part of what makes a 
working woman successful, because in doctrine the vision of the self-
sufficient working woman and that of the woman embracing mother-
hood do not often co-exist.  More often, women in doctrine are trying 
to deal with or handle pregnancy in an attempt to re-attain their equal 
or “sameness” status.  Anti-discrimination law, which is typically pro-
tective or compensatory, is a necessity for women’s progress but may 
not always be a basis for empowerment.85 
When women are being empowered in the doctrine, it is most of-
ten in their pursuit of male achievement—the more they are treated 
like men, the more success they have achieved.  Because pregnancy 
does not fit into the male paradigm, it is not part of the vision for suc-
cess.  It is hard, if not impossible, to find examples in the doctrine of 
women affirmatively empowered by pursuing the dual role of working 
woman and parent, in part because of how cases arise—i.e., typically 
demanding a response to discriminatory or degradative action taken 
by others.  A different way to conceive of accommodation is to imag-
ine that the workplace itself should adjust in nature to facilitate dif-
ferent choices, rather than forcing individuals who make different 
choices to adjust themselves to comport with their existing role in the 
workplace. 
5. Other Limitations of Rights-Based Doctrine 
Because each case arises under its own unique circumstances, 
rights tend to be defined in isolation.  By its very nature, doctrine can-
                                                                                                                           
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/opinion/pregnant-and-pushed-out-of-a-job.html?_r=0 (ex-
plaining that many accommodations for pregnant workers promote economic security and public 
health and may even have a positive impact on the bottom line for businesses). 
 84 See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text. 
 85 For a discussion of how “accommodation” laws fit into the larger anti-discrimination 
legal framework, see generally Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001). 
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not serve as all-encompassing sociocultural analysis, but is instead re-
stricted to the resolution of conflicts that have arisen in the context of 
litigation.  This makes it a poor framework in which to think about 
identity, which is by its nature a holistic concept.  Those facing this 
dilemma are not litigants in their day-to-day existence; rather, they 
deal with every variation of the work-family conflict as part of their 
own life experience.86 
The rights framework also has the potential to disguise shared in-
terests and, at its worst, can pit groups against each other rather than 
facilitate productive discussion.  Creating rights in a static framework 
makes it harder to envision how the duties or assumptions giving rise 
to those rights may be redistributed: “Legal rights based on gender 
may prevent people from dividing, sharing, permuting, and question-
ing gender roles.”87  Failing to view pregnancy as a sex or gender-based 
characteristic, as the Court has sometimes done, unduly prejudices 
women, yet to assign pregnancy—and, by extension, childrearing—to 
the woman’s “sphere” prevents us from adopting the broader view of 
childrearing and caretaking as a social enterprise for which all parties 
involved must assume responsibility. 
Finally, rights also have the potential to be exclusive: low-income 
women who cannot make a claim to equal treatment based on wealth 
are left little recourse other than to appeal to the empathy or generos-
ity of those with political clout to effect change.  I would be remiss if I 
did not at some point observe the “having it all” debate’s near exclu-
sion of lower-income, working-class women who may not be as con-
cerned with “having it all” as they are with having no choice but to 
juggle everything, and too few resources to address more basic needs.88  
                                                                                                                           
 86 For a discussion of the multidimensional framework, which derives from constructive 
feminism and recognizes that each person has multiple dimensions to his or her life—including 
work, family, leisure, culture and civic life—that must all exist alongside one another, see general-
ly Barzilay, supra note 5. 
 87 Clarke, supra note 77, at 1243. 
 88 See Slaughter, supra note 1 (“I am well aware that the majority of American women face 
problems far greater than any discussed in this article.  I am writing for my demographic—highly 
educated, well-off women who are privileged enough to have choices in the first place.”); 
Sherilynn Ifill, Forget “All”: Why Most Women Never Even Get Half, BEACON BROADSIDE (Jul. 
23, 2012), http://www.beaconbroadside.com/broadside/2012/07/why-most-women-never-even-get-
half.html (emphasizing that women who are at the economic bottom—in sharp contrast to the 
fabled top 1%—have far greater challenges and are denied the “luxury” of making the types of 
choices referenced by Slaughter); see also Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-
Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 8 (2007) (“[A]lthough working-class women 
and professional women had access to maternity or family leave at nearly the same rate in the 
early 1960s, professional women now have far more access than working-class women.”); Mi-
chael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Women in the Workplace: Which Women, Which Agenda?, 13 DUKE 
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 7, 8 (2006) (“As a result of the focus on professional women, the policy 
proposals many work-family scholars have advocated tend to reflect the interests, and the op-
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This phenomenon may itself have a doctrinal basis, given the doc-
trine’s failure to require equal treatment on the basis of wealth89 or to 
recognize the practical implications of poverty on rights enforcement.90  
The failure not only of doctrine, but also of statutory law in this re-
gard,91 to recognize that only those with means have the ability to ask 
this question—or to structure their life in such a way that they have a 
meaningful choice—is also shared by the “having it all” debate. 
B. Rebounding From Rights: Where Do We Go From Here? 
For women who have been raised to appreciate the gains of the 
women’s liberation movement and the rights that arose from the bat-
tles fought (and those that are still being fought), it is hard to escape 
the tendency to define oneself by one’s rights.  How, in the context of 
that framework, can women fully realize the potential carved out for 
them in the workplace while simultaneously maintaining a meaningful 
role at home and in the raising of their children? 
While the doctrinal framework is critical to ensuring the ability of 
women to pursue certain ends, its emphasis on individual autonomy, 
its focus on fitting women to a male mold, its assumption that all 
women share certain goals and priorities, and its inability to empower 
                                                                                                                           
tions, of those same women.  The most frequently mentioned proposals—creating more and 
better part-time work, shorter work hours and greater workplace flexibility—are proposals that 
are of utility primarily to professional women, those, in other words, who can afford to trade less 
income for more family time.”). 
 Although as demonstrated by the popularity of books like Lean In, see supra note 69, there 
is certainly a hungry audience for policy proposals and general advice directed toward women at 
the top of the socio-economic ladder, there is a also a great need for women with the benefits of 
educational and economic privilege to use their access to the microphone, so to speak, to advo-
cate for women whose voices are not as powerful. See Ifill, supra (advocating that women in the 
1% “have the power to take the lead in changing the conditions that make it nearly impossible 
for [low-income women] to work and parent effectively” and “to transform the work/family 
reality for women at the economic bottom, who are seeking the luxury of the kind of choices 
about which Slaughter and I wring our hands”). 
 89 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973) (declining to review 
under “heightened scrutiny” a claim that a state discriminated against residents of less wealthy 
school districts in its provision of educational benefits). 
 90 See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1977) (holding Equal Protection Clause 
does not require a state participating in Medicaid program to pay expenses incident to nonther-
apeutic abortions for indigent women); see also, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 245 (1982) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The Equal Protection Clause protects against arbitrary and irrational 
classifications, and against invidious discrimination stemming from prejudice and hostility; it is 
not an all-encompassing “equalizer” designed to eradicate every distinction for which persons 
are not ‘responsible.’”). 
 91 See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construc-
tion of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 492 (2001) (“FMLA leave is disproportion-
ately accessible to low-income men and women—those who need its protections most—who 
either do not meet the eligibility criteria or who cannot afford to take unpaid leave.”). 
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woman in her dual role make it a poor framework for defining identi-
ty.  Perhaps the guiding principles for this next phase of the journey—
and those that should form the basis of the framework for thinking 
about future policy initiatives—can instead be found in responding to 
the failings of the rights-based paradigm. 
First, we must recognize the importance of defining one’s own 
goals and priorities, rather than adhering to a traditionally male norm 
as the ideal.  Adhering to a “male” norm is not only unworkable, but it 
is undesirable for many women (and men).  We need to redefine the 
notion of “success,” for ourselves and as a culture, and the role that 
work and family will play for each of us in that individualized vision—
whether that vision includes having children or not, doing so with a 
partner or not, and simultaneously working or not.  In doing so, we 
can avoid some of the cognitive dissonance that comes with trying to 
pair a lifestyle and set of goals that are incompatible.  Of course, the 
best way to facilitate the freedom to define one’s own goals and prior-
ities would be to have as broad a range of policies and working ar-
rangements as possible, so that one could delineate one’s own prefer-
ences and then have the policies available to enable those prefer-
ences.92  Policies should enable and even incentivize choice but avoid 
making assumptions. 
Second, although as a society we must continue in the quest to 
ensure that women are truly afforded equal treatment in the work-
place,93 we should stop casting work-family balance as a problem re-
served exclusively for women or that women have exclusive responsi-
bility to solve.  As discussed above, this unfairly places the burden on 
women to resolve a much larger societal problem and prevents the 
encouragement of a universal conversation about the role of both 
men and women in childrearing.94 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See RHODE, supra note 76, at 124 (“[T]he preferable approach is to press for the broad-
est possible maternal, paternal, and medical coverage for all workers.”). 
 93 The Court’s recent decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 
(2007), highlights the need to remain cognizant of the workplace equality issues women continue 
to face. See id. at 624-25 (holding that plaintiff’s claims of sex-based salary discrimination were 
time-barred because even though disparate pay was received during the statutory limitations 
period, the decision giving rise to that discrimination occurred outside of the limitations period).  
The Ledbetter decision was later effectively overturned by Congress’s passage of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (West 2013) (providing that the 180-
day statute of limitations for filing an equal-pay lawsuit regarding pay discrimination resets with 
each new paycheck affected by that discriminatory action). 
 94 See Barzilay, supra note 5, at 431 (“[R]egulation ought to be constructed by enacting 
new rules for the labor market that are sensitive to the current life realities of women (as care-
givers and workers), on the one hand, and to the aspiration of multidimensionalism for all, on the 
other.”). 
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Third, rather than focusing on autonomy at all costs, we need to 
recognize that, in attempting to strike a work-family balance, autono-
my—or the pure (theoretical) ability to make choices—is not enough.  
We also need to acknowledge that the exercise of autonomy cannot be 
maximized without cost or at least without great strain.  By expanding 
the notion of autonomy to include not just the freedom to claim re-
sponsibility but also to disclaim it, by providing others (i.e., men) with 
the autonomy to make similar choices, and by making the notion of 
“choice” a more realistic one by implementing supportive structures 
that enable choice for all individuals (including those without financial 
means), women would be much freer to define their own identity or 
work-life balance.   
Fourth, we need to shift our mindset so that pregnancy and chil-
drearing is not merely something to be “accommodated” in an already 
existing frame; accommodation should be a two-way, not a one-way 
street.  Environments should accommodate people, as well as expect-
ing accommodation by the individual.  In the same vein, the working 
woman who decides to have children should be empowered in her 
dual role as employee and mother, rather than viewing the two as 
competing ends.   
Some examples of policies that would further the above goals are: 
the implementation of paid parental leave,95 expanded and standard 
paternity leave/caretaking policies,96 broadened definitions of who can 
take leave to provide care for a child,97 and restructuring the school 
day to more closely mirror the workday.98  One real-world example of 
a law that has accomplished much of the above and has played an im-
portant norm-changing role is that governing Sweden’s parental leave 
system.  In 1974, Sweden replaced maternity leave with a 13-month 
paid parental leave, and then in 1995, introduced “daddy leave”: fa-
thers were not forced to stay home, but the family would lose one 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See Natasha Bhushan, Note, Work-Family Policy in the United States, 21 CORNELL J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 677, 691-92 (2012). 
 96 See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1052 (1994); see 
also Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25, 31-32 (1998). 
 97 See Bhushan, supra note 95, at 692-93 (noting that state versions of the FMLA have 
been expanded to include grandparents and the children of domestic partners); see generally 
Jessica Dixon Weaver, Grandma in the White House: Legal Support for Intergenerational Caregiv-
ing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing for expansion of the ability of grandparents to 
serve as caregivers). 
 98 See, e.g., Selmi & Cahn, supra note 88, at 24-25.  Selmi and Cahn acknowledge that this 
would result in a much longer day for children, but rightfully point out that many children of 
working mothers already spend that long in daycare or in school and after-care. See id. at 24 & 
n.73. 
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month in subsidies if a father chose to forgo his leave.99  This policy has 
greatly increased the number of men taking leave—after the change 
in 1995, more than eight in ten men took leave—and has been de-
scribed as a “striking example of social engineering.”100  The broadness 
of the policy—covering both men and women—and its provision for 
paid leave encourages each parent to play a role in providing child 
care, provides both sexes with real options (and for women, the ability 
to disclaim some amount of responsibility), and allows both men and 
women to strike their own balance.101  Now that the responsibility to 
care for children has been imposed more broadly, the workplace has 
itself adapted out of necessity, making “accommodation” less neces-
sary.102 
None of these policy suggestions are novel and some may be 
much more feasible than others.  Regardless, there is a benefit in dis-
tancing ourselves from the rights-based framework in this next phase 
of the discussion: thinking about how we build a bridge from founda-
tional rights to a new reality.  I am not suggesting abandonment of law, 
by any means.  Law—and statutory law in particular, as evidenced by 
the Sweden example—has an important role to play in changing the 
workplace and the cultural norms influencing it.  In developing policy 
measures, however, the guiding principles discussed above would 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Katrin Bennhold, Paternity Leave Law Helps to Redefine Masculinity in Sweden, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 15, 2010, at A6.  Parents also have the flexibility to use their paid leave however they 
wish up until their child’s eighth birthday.  Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 As Arianne Renan Barzilay notes, Sweden’s policy could be further improved—
particularly considering the significant single-parent family population in the United States—by 
offering “daddy leave” not only to fathers, but to “partners or other persons significantly in-
volved in childrearing, such as a grandparent.”  Barzilay, supra note 5, at 434. 
Contrast mandatory maternity leave policies, which avoid the difficult choice, but can be 
even more restrictive with regard to identity development. See generally Julie C. Suk, From Anti-
discrimination to Equality: Stereotypes and the Life Cycle in the United States and Europe, 60 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 75 (2012). 
 102 Cf. Barzilay, supra note 5, at 434 (“This mechanism thus encourages fathers to make use 
of the leave, normalizes men’s caretaking roles and responsibilities and educates the labor mar-
ket that both men and women have active caretaking duties, in the hope that that will decrease 
workplace gender discrimination against women caregivers.”).  No policy solution comes without 
cost, and it may be that the European model has other adverse effects regarding women’s posi-
tion in the labor market.  See Julie Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking 
Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 65 (2010) (observing 
that Sweden’s labor market remains “highly segregated by gender,” that such “occupational 
segregation is not the result of discrimination,” and that “[b]y protecting part-time workers and 
parents’ right to work part-time in the first few years of a child’s life, both French and Swedish 
law have facilitated women’s disproportionate concentration in part-time jobs.”); see also id. at 
66 (concluding that “generous parental leave policies do not undermine gendered patterns of 
working and caring, and may encourage gender stratification”). 
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serve as a better basis for adopting some policies and rejecting others 
than the principles underlying a rights-based framework.103 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this piece is not to undermine the importance of 
sex or gender-based discrimination doctrine or of rights.  The point 
this Article seeks to make is that while the doctrine and the rights re-
sulting from that doctrine provide a necessary foundation, they do not 
provide the answers to the dilemma facing many women today.  If an-
ything, the doctrine may make the search for identity more problem-
atic, given its mixed messages about the role of women in the work-
place and as mothers, and its tendency to carve out absolute roles dis-
tanced from the compromise many of us seek in our day-to-day reali-
ty.  While a rights-based strategy founded in formal equality was nec-
essary for making inroads into a world from which women had tradi-
tionally been (and, in some cases, continue to be) excluded, rights-
based discourse or litigation may have limited utility in the context of 
identity formation or development.  For example, Kenji Yoshino has 
observed:  
When I think about the elaboration of my gay identity, I am 
grateful to see litigation has had little to do with it. . . .  I am trou-
bled that Americans seem increasingly to turn toward the law to 
do the work of civil rights precisely when they should be turning 
away from it.104 
What role, then, should law play in the ongoing debate regarding 
work family balance?  Although, as Joan Williams has noted, there 
may be many political barriers to structural change,105 law still has im-
portant potential to enable choice and shift cultural norms.  My point 
here is not to suggest that law has no role to play, but rather that for 
second-generation problems, the rights-based paradigm—and, by ex-
                                                                                                                           
 103 For example, focusing only on enhanced maternity policies supports the idea that preg-
nancy and childbearing remain in the woman’s “sphere.”  See RHODE, supra note 76, at 122 
(noting that “‘[m]ommy tracks’ often become ‘mommy traps,’” relegating women to slower 
career tracks).  Degendered or gender-neutral policies fail to recognize women’s unique differ-
ences and may leave women feeling that their identity as women is not being adequately recog-
nized. 
 104 KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 193-94 
(2006); see also id. at 194 (explaining that some of the best advice the author received was to 
“speak my truth and make the law shape itself around me”). 
 105 Joan C. Williams, Want Gender Equality?: Die Childless at Thirty, 27 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 3, 16 (2006) (“[P]ublic policy clearly is a more direct route to resolving work-
force/workplace mismatch.  Yet the reality is that, given the current political climate, public 
policy is going to take small steps.”). 
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tension, the Court—cannot accomplish those aims alone.106  To assume 
otherwise would be to expect the impossible in light of the Court’s 
institutional limitations, which are much better suited to the task of 
rights definition.  That said, even if rights continue to serve as a neces-
sary backdrop, we should be wary of applying the same approach the 
Court has applied in defining rights when thinking about current poli-
cy problems. 
A productive conversation about how to move the discussion of 
work-family balance forward need not remain rooted in the rights-
based discourse that was necessary to its origination.107  Ultimately, the 
next phase of the work-family debate should be driven by the recogni-
tion that one’s identity is more than a compilation of individual rights 
or entitlements and that those rights are not exercised in a vacuum.  It 
will be more important to explore how we can allow both men and 
women to actualize their ideal balance of work and family and to re-
calibrate what and who we value such that the decision to start a fami-
ly is not solely affiliated with the exercise of individual rights, but also 
allows for the formation of new identities that are holistically sup-
ported by society and the workplace. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
 107 Cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 14 (1991) (“The most distinctive features of our American rights dialect are the very 
ones that are most conspicuously in tension with what we require to give a reasonably full and 
coherent account of what kind of society we are and what kind of polity we are trying to create. . 
. .  Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, 
and inhibits dialogue that might lead towards consensus, accommodation or at least the discov-
ery of common ground.”). 
